UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/21
11 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that Lieutenant General Çevik Bir, the Force Commander of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), will be relinquishing his post as from 15 February 1994.

It is my intention, subject to the approval of the Security Council, to appoint Lieutenant General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar of Malaysia to succeed General Bir as Force Commander.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

94-01518 (E) 110194 110194

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/22
11 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 6 January 1994 (S/1994/21) concerning your proposal to appoint Lieutenant General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar of Malaysia to succeed Lieutenant General Çevik Bir as Force Commander of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They agree with the proposal contained therein.

(Signed) Karel KOVANDA
President of the Security Council

94-01524 (E) 110194 110194

UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/23
11 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to my letter of 3 September 1993 (S/26404) to the President of the Security Council concerning the composition of the military component of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and to the President's reply thereto of the same date (S/26405).

Having completed the necessary consultations, I propose that Egypt, Hungary and Jordan be added to the list of Member States contributing military personnel to UNOMIG.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

94-01530 (E) 110194 110194

UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1994/24
11 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 5 January 1994 (S/1994/23) concerning the additions to the list of Member States contributing military personnel to the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the information contained in your letter and agree with the proposal mentioned therein.

(Signed) Karel KOVANDA
President of the Security Council

94-01536 (E) 110194 110194

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/25
11 January 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 11 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the latest developments with regard to Iraq's non-compliance with Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and all the other relevant resolutions since the Council's last review, on 18 November 1993, of the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq.

The course followed by Iraq in the matter of its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions remains unchanged.

The repeated Iraqi allegations that Kuwait is a part of Iraq are clear proofs of Iraq's lack of concern about complying with the relevant Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, those allegations are a clear and unequivocal proof that Iraq is not ready to acknowledge the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Kuwait, an issue that lies at the core of all the relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 687 (1991) and 833 (1993).

The following is a review of the most recent Iraqi allegations concerning Kuwait, since the last review:

Iraqi claims that Kuwait is a part of Iraq

Senior Iraqi officials and all the information media assiduously reiterate the empty claims and lying assertions that Kuwait is the nineteenth governorate of Iraq and the threat of another invasion, in blatant violation of Security Council resolutions, in particular the second preambular paragraph of cease-fire resolution 687 (1991), which was accepted by Iraq unconditionally.

In our previous letters to your esteemed Council, we have emphasized on numerous occasions that the gravity of these claims, which were the major cause of the invasion, lies in the fact that they unmask the continuation of the aggressive intentions harboured by Iraq against Kuwait and the indomitable will to create a state of instability in the region, expressed in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and still evident in its express rejection of resolution 833 (1993).

We shall recall for you and your esteemed Council some of these Iraqi claims that have emerged since the previous review up to the date of the drafting of this letter.

1. On 24 November 1993, the Iraqi newspaper Al-Jumhuriyah published one part of an article entitled "Questions of defiance in an age of challenges", by Salah Mukhtar, the Editor of the paper. In it he answers questions such as: Why did we go into Kuwait? Why did we refuse to withdraw from Kuwait? Why did we withdraw from Kuwait? The writer, in his article, when speaking of the objectives of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait - which he calls "the liberation of Kuwait" - refers to "the consolidation of Iraq's right to a part of it that was severed by force (Kuwait) and the inculcation of awareness of this right in world and Arab public opinion".

The writer affirms what he said about Kuwait in another part of this article, namely: "The other direct objective was to revive the issue of the Iraqi character of Kuwait, for Iraq's conviction that this severed part of the mother country might turn into a dangerous instrument for sabotage removed all elements of the patience and tolerance that governed Iraq's dealings with the artificial entity that Great Britain established in Kuwait and made it necessary to open up the whole file on Kuwait".

2. On 24 November 1993, the Iraqi newspaper Iraq published an article entitled "Oh our people in Kuwait ... ! How long?", by Qasim Hasan, in which he said, as though shouting: "Frontiers? Frontiers? Kuwait must be returned".

In the next paragraph of the same article, the writer refers to Kuwait as though it were a part of Iraq and had no other option. He says: "Kuwait with the ... family will remain a prisoner of one of two situations, either foreign occupation or the flight of its thieving rulers with the first shot fired across the trench. So consider. How long? How long?"

3. On 27 November 1993, the Iraqi newspaper Al-Jumhuriyah published an article entitled "The rulers of Kuwait and foreign muscle", by Lutfi al-Khayyat, threatening and menacing Kuwait. In one paragraph, he says that the day will inevitably come when they (the Coalition States) will abandon the rulers of Kuwait, and on that day accounts will be settled and that policy, in the colonialist Western sense, is based not on friendly relations but on interests.

In the next paragraph, he says: "The rulers imposed on Kuwait must know well that he who relies on another for his protection cannot sleep tranquilly, and he who relies on the muscle of another cannot have a strong hand, for any breath of wind can easily break that hand".

4. On 29 December 1993, the Iraqi newspaper Babil - of which Udayy Saddam Hussein, the son of the leader of the Iraqi regime, is Editor-in-Chief - in a news item entitled: "For lack of men", used, as it normally does when relating news about Kuwaiti affairs, expressions intended to indicate that Kuwait is still a part of Iraq: "For the first time in the history of Kuwait Governorate, a woman has been appointed to the post of ambassador. The newspapers that appeared in the Governorate today, Tuesday, state that yesterday, Monday, Nabilah al-Mala took the oath in Kuwait

Governorate, following her appointment as non-resident ambassador for the Governorate to Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe".

5. In addition, the official radio, which is the voice of the regime in power in Baghdad, deliberately uses the term "Kuwait area" whenever the context calls for a mention of the State of Kuwait, a clear indication that the Government of the Iraqi regime still persists in its allegations that the State of Kuwait is a part of Iraq.

The above examples are irrefutable proof that Iraq continues to be defiant with regard to compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions. In addition, they constitute a flagrant breach of the obligations which Iraq entered into by its acceptance of these resolutions and, consequently, defiance of the will of your esteemed Council and the will of the international community. The continued Iraqi allegations that Kuwait is a part of Iraq are not the only evidence of Iraq's refusal to comply with Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and all the other relevant resolutions. The following provides evidence of an additional failure on Iraq's part to comply with the will of the Security Council.

Prisoners and missing persons (Kuwaitis and nationals of third countries)

With regard to this humanitarian question, in spite of the elapse of some three years since the adoption of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and in spite of Iraq's official acceptance of this resolution, no progress has been made, as evidenced by the following:

1. Iraq has persistently refused to attend the meetings of the tripartite committee (composed of the members of the Coalition, Iraq and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)), which deals with the question of prisoners, detainees and missing persons. Iraq refused to attend the most recent meetings of the tripartite committee which were convened by ICRC and met at Geneva recently.

2. Iraq has so far not discharged its obligations under paragraph 30 of resolution 687 (1991), which requires that Iraq extend all necessary cooperation to ICRC, providing lists of prisoners and detainees, facilitating the access of ICRC to the places where they are located or detained and facilitating its search for such persons.

3. Iraq has so far not responded to the official request from ICRC to obtain information concerning the files of 627 individuals, even though it is now 10 months since the files were handed over to Iraq. Iraq has thus reneged on its previous undertaking to provide an answer on each file within 10 days of receiving it.

4. Outside the framework of the Security Council machinery, Iraq prevented the Envoy of the Secretary-General to the League of Arab States, Mr. Rashid Idris, from performing his mission of visiting Iraq and using his good offices as a means of securing the release of the prisoners and detainees. Similarly, Iraq frustrated the endeavours of the ruler of Morocco, His Majesty King Hassan II,

and his mediation efforts aimed at securing the release of Kuwaiti prisoners and detainees.

5. In another shameless and vicious attempt to disrupt action on this vital issue, Iraq recently called for the establishment of a committee composed of Morocco, Qatar and members of the Kuwaiti Parliament "to clear up this issue with an investigation of the facts directly". This Iraqi proposal, which represents an admission on the part of Iraq that there are in fact prisoners and detainees of Kuwaiti and other nationalities, was designed to confuse the issue. It is aimed at confusing the issue and sidestepping the relevant Security Council resolutions and the efforts of ICRC. With regard to this proposal, it should be pointed out that Kuwait welcomes all efforts aimed at promoting a solution of this humanitarian issue, provided that such efforts are made in the context of the will of the international community as embodied in Security Council resolution 687 (1990) and all the other relevant resolutions.

Compensation Fund

Iraq has not fulfilled its obligations with regard to compensation under section E of resolution 687 (1991) and still refuses to implement resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), which constitutes a violation that injures Iraqis and non-Iraqis alike. The humanitarian aspect of this question cannot be disregarded.

Return of property seized from the private sector

Iraq still insists that it is not responsible for returning the property, valued at hundreds of millions of dollars, which was stolen from the private sector and most of which was removed to Iraq, as documented in the lists published by the various Iraqi ministries (S/26449).

Iraqi nationals and their property in Kuwait

Although Kuwait is committed to compensating Iraqi land-owning farmers for their property on the Kuwaiti side of the boundary, Iraq still rejects the principle of the resettlement and compensation of these farmers. Furthermore, the Iraqi authorities are putting pressure on the land-owning farmers to refuse to cooperate with the United Nations expert surveyor entrusted with the task of assessing property values and the number of Iraqi nationals located on the Kuwaiti side of the border.

The above-mentioned issues are a clear indication of Iraq's persistence in following the policy of defiance of Security Council resolutions. Since the objective of these resolutions is to ensure full respect for the independence, sovereignty and territoriality of Kuwait, it is incumbent on the international community to take appropriate measures to guarantee Iraq's compliance with all the relevant Security Council resolutions, in letter and in spirit. The Council should deal not only with the effects of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait but also with the motives behind the invasion. In other words, the Security Council should focus on the ongoing Iraqi insistence that Kuwait is a part of Iraq. Otherwise, Iraqi objectives will continue to present a threat to peace and security in the region.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nasser S. B. AL-SABEEH
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/26
12 January 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 10 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, and further to my letter of 7 December 1993, I have the honour to inform you of the violations of the cease-fire provisions and the terms governing the area of separation committed by the Iranian side during the period from 20 November to 26 December 1993.

20 November 1993

The Iranian side set up antennas for intelligence equipment 500 metres from the Iranian bank of the Shatt al-Arab at geographical coordinates 122608 inside the area of separation.

21 November 1993

The Iranian side set up antennas for intelligence equipment 500 metres from the Iranian bank of the Shatt al-Arab at geographical coordinates 05689, 083587, 190564 and 228518 inside the area of separation.

1 December 1993

At 0730 hours, a group of about six men from the Iranian side were seen repairing shelters at geographical coordinates 518529 in front of the Fakkah guard post inside the area of separation.

2 December 1993

At 2150 hours, the sound of two Iranian single-engine boats was heard. The boats proceeded from the Iranian rear towards the rampart, from which point they fired light weapons in the direction of the Iraqi units at geographical coordinates 544606 and then departed at top speed.

6 December 1993

At 0720 hours, a group of 30 to 40 men from the Iranian side were seen doing mortar training at geographical coordinates 514501 in front of the Fakkah guard post inside the area of separation.

7 December 1993

At 1600 hours, a group of about six soldiers from the Iranian side were seen building a position at geographical coordinates 502512 in front of the Fakkah guard post inside the area of separation.

8 December 1993

(a) At 1200 hours, a group of nine men from the Iranian side with an excavator were seen building an earthen embankment near the Iranian post at geographical coordinates 548446. At 1500 hours, they withdrew to the Iranian rear, having built a 1.5-metre-high and 50-metre-long embankment to the east of the Iranian post inside the area of separation.

(b) At 1600 hours, a new Land Cruiser belonging to the Iranian side was seen carrying six men with a video camera. They photographed the area facing the Iraqi units at geographical coordinates 7122 in front of the Shib guard post inside the area of separation.

9 December 1993

(a) At 0830 hours, two Iranian helicopters were seen overflying Abadan and then returning to the Iranian rear.

(b) At 0930 hours, an Iranian helicopter was seen coming from Muhammarah. It flew parallel to the Shatt al-Arab on the Iranian side, continued flying until it was across from Sayhan and returned to Muhammarah.

(c) At 1010 hours, three Iranian helicopters were seen coming from the Iranian rear, flying in the direction of Sayhan. They then made for Abadan, flying parallel to the Shatt al-Arab on the Iranian side, and landed at Abadan airport.

11 December 1993

At 0910 hours, a group of six soldiers from the Iranian side were seen repairing the Iranian radio transmitting post at geographical coordinates 039939 in front of the Tib guard post inside the area of separation, using corrugated iron and a bulldozer.

12 December 1993

At 1045 hours, a small Iranian patrol boat was seen leaving Abadan port in the direction of the sea, with three men in military uniform on board. One was carrying field-glasses with which he was observing the Iraqi side. The boat returned to Abadan port at 1200 hours carrying the same men.

14 December 1993

At 1150 hours, a group of about six soldiers from the Iranian side set up radio equipment at geographical coordinates 503533 in front of the Fakkah guard post inside the area of separation.

16 December 1993

A boat carrying five men armed with rifles, four of them in military uniform and the other in mufti, one of them carrying field-glasses, was launched on the Shatt al-Arab at geographical coordinates 06560 and approached the Iraqi bank for purposes of reconnaissance. It returned to its point of departure at 1200 hours.

17 December 1993

At 1455 hours, the Iranian side reinforced the Iranian post at geographical coordinates 905239 in the Kishk area inside the area of separation in front of one of the Iraqi forward units with an additional five men, four of them carrying Kalashnikov rifles and the other a PKC automatic rifle with their accoutrements.

19 December 1993

The Iranian side opened up a new observation post in front of the Iraqi forward units at geographical coordinates 0570.

20 December 1993

(a) At 1545 hours, an Iranian patrol boat left Abadan port with three soldiers on board, one of them an officer carrying field-glasses to observe the Iraqi side. At 1630 hours, the boat returned to its point of departure.

(b) At 1725 hours, the Iranian side fired two illuminating shells from an 81-millimetre mortar at the Iraqi units at geographical coordinates 904886.

22 December 1993

At 0955 hours, the Iranian side proceeded to build an Iranian post of blocks and cement, with a sheet-iron roof, at geographical coordinates 907751 inside the area of separation.

23 December 1993

(a) At 2300 hours, the Iranian side fired an illuminating shell from an 81-millimetre mortar, which fell at geographical coordinates 906845 (Kut Sawadi), 200 metres from the Iraqi forward units.

(b) At 2340 hours, the Iranian side fired two illuminating shells from an 81-millimetre mortar, which fell at geographical coordinates 906845 (Kut al-Sawadi) and geographical coordinates 904872 (Bubiyan), respectively. The shells were followed by an estimated 50 shots from light weapons in the direction of the Iraqi units at geographical coordinates 922872.

24 December 1993

(a) At 0100 hours, the Iranian side fired six illuminating shells from an 81-millimetre mortar. Four of these fell at geographical coordinates 914862 (Bubiyan) and two at geographical coordinates 901872 (Bubiyan), 200 metres from the Iraqi forward units.

(b) At 2050 hours, the Iranian side fired an illuminating shell from an 81-millimetre mortar, which fell at geographical coordinates 906844 (Kut al-Sawadi), 200 metres from the Iraqi units.

(c) At 2110 hours, the Iranian side fired two illuminating shells from a mortar, which fell at geographical coordinates 906844 (Kut al-Sawadi), 200 metres from the Iraqi units.

(d) At 2115 hours, the Iranian side fired three illuminating shells from an 81-millimetre mortar in front of crossing point No. 8. The shells fell at geographical coordinates 944742 (Kharnubiyah), 200 metres from the Iraqi units.

26 December 1993

At 1500 hours, the Iranian side fired an illuminating shell from an 81-millimetre mortar, which fell at geographical coordinates 906844 (Kut al-Sawadi), 200 metres from the Iraqi units. At 1502 hours, the Iranian side fired an illuminating shell from an 81-millimetre mortar, which fell at the same geographical coordinates.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/27
13 January 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 13 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 12 January 1994 from Mr. Mohammed Said al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the fact that the United States is continuing its acts of aggression and provocation involving the dropping of leaflets, in coordination with the Kuwaiti regime.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

94-02045 (E) 140194 140194 150194

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Annex

Letter dated 12 January 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

I should like to refer to my two letters dated 9 and 16 December 1993, in which I set forth detailed information concerning the acts of aggression and provocation carried out by United States and other war planes, which violated Iraqi airspace by flights originating in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Those aircraft continued their acts of provocation on 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 December 1993.

We have followed up these acts of aggression and provocation, and, after investigation of the facts, we have ascertained that the Kuwaiti regime has carried out these acts, in coordination with the United States, which has been imposing the aerial embargo on southern Iraq, forcibly and illegally, since August 1992.

In reporting these facts to you, we request you to have this letter brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/28
13 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 765 (1992) of 16 July 1992 and 772 (1992) of 17 August 1992,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the question of South Africa dated 10 January 1994 (S/1994/16),

Welcoming the further progress made in establishing a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa, and in particular the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council and the Independent Electoral Commission, and the agreement on the Interim Constitution,

Noting that the legal framework of the electoral process in South Africa leading to the elections to be held on 27 April 1994 is defined by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Electoral Acts, the Independent Media Commission Act and the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act,

Commending the positive contribution already made by the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) to the transitional process in South Africa and to efforts to curb violence,

Commending also the positive contribution of the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth and the European Union in this regard,

Reiterating its determination to continue to support the process of peaceful democratic change in South Africa for the benefit of all South Africans,

Recalling the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 23 November 1993 (S/26785), in which the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to accelerate contingency planning for a possible United Nations role in the election process, including coordination with the observer missions of the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth and the European Union, to enable expeditious consideration of a request to the United Nations for such assistance,

Noting General Assembly resolutions 48/159 A of 20 December 1993 and 48/219 of 21 December 1993, in which the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General to accelerate planning for a United Nations role in the election process, in consultation with the Security Council and in coordination with the observer missions of the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth and the European Union,

Having considered the request of the Transitional Executive Council that the United Nations provide a sufficient number of international observers to monitor the electoral process and to coordinate the activities of the international observers provided by the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth and the European Union as well as those provided by Governments (S/1994/16), and accepting the need to respond urgently to this request,

1. Welcomes with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General of 10 January 1994 and agrees with the proposals contained therein concerning the mandate and size of UNOMSA, including the proposals for the coordination of the activities of the international observers provided by the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth and the European Union as well as those provided by any other intergovernmental organizations or Governments;

2. Urges all parties in South Africa, including those which did not participate fully in the multi-party talks, to respect agreements reached during the negotiations, to adhere to democratic principles, and to take part in the elections;

3. Calls upon all parties in South Africa to take measures to end the violence and intimidation and thus contribute to the conduct of free and fair elections, and expects that anyone who seeks to disrupt the elections will be held accountable for such actions;

4. Calls also upon all parties in South Africa to respect the safety and security of the international observers and to facilitate the carrying out of their mandate;

5. Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to set up a special Trust Fund to finance the participation of additional observers from Africa and other developing countries and urges States to contribute generously to this Fund;

6. Decides to remain seized of the matter until a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa is established.

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GENERAL

S/1994/29
14 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARMENIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you a copy of the note presented today by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this statement as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alexander ARZOUMANIAN
Permanent Representative

Annex

Note dated 13 January 1994 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic

[Original: Russian]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia deems it necessary to state the following to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic.

On 13 January, this year, at 7 a.m., military units of the Azerbaijani side with a strength of two motor rifle companies, reinforced with armoured infantry fighting vehicles and artillery, crossed the Armenia-Nakhichevan border from the village of Gyaramachatakh in the direction of the village of Bartsruni and penetrated a distance of 1 kilometre into the territory of the Republic of Armenia, engaging in military action against units of the Armenian Army.

All of this is taking place at a time when the world community, in the person of international organizations and individual countries, is making efforts aimed at the settlement of the Karabakh-Azerbaijan conflict and establishing good-neighbourly relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The Baku authorities bear direct responsibility for this new round of escalation in the region, as well as for those which took place earlier, and for involving the Republic of Armenia in a wide-scale armed conflict between the two republics. Moreover, such a flagrant act of aggression against a sovereign State could lead to an unprecedented and extremely dangerous internationalization of the conflict.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia registers with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic a strong protest against this act of aggression by Azerbaijani armed forces against the Republic of Armenia. The Azerbaijani side bears full responsibility for the consequences.

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GENERAL

S/1994/30
14 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LEBANON TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that the Lebanese Government has decided to request the Security Council to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which expires on 31 January 1994, for a further period of six months, on the basis of the provisions of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 508 (1982) and 509 (1982) and of all other relevant resolutions and decisions of the Security Council.

Since the last renewal of UNIFIL, the situation in Lebanon has continued to improve with the consolidation of national reconciliation. Law and order are established, bringing with them the return of normalcy. Most foreign diplomatic missions have reopened while citizens abroad and displaced persons are steadily returning to their homes and properties. Construction on downtown Beirut's new commercial centre has begun, along with projects to rebuild the national infrastructure, with emphasis on electricity, telecommunications, transportation, waterworks, schools and hospitals. Indications of growing national confidence are substantial increases in the deposits of Lebanese banks, reductions in the trade deficit, and a 7 per cent increase in the gross national product (GNP). A further sign of growing confidence is the ability the Lebanese have demonstrated in funding projects themselves in advance of target dates. There is a boom in construction and the country is witnessing the renaissance of its cultural, artistic, touristic, and educational institutions.

My Government is further pleased to report that the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL continue to coordinate in perfect harmony towards the end of deploying the Lebanese Army throughout the south of the country up to the internationally recognized boundaries.

However, in spite of these positive developments, the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, while wreaking havoc, continues to thwart and preclude Lebanon's complete recovery. Furthermore, Israel continues to perpetuate this occupation at a time when the whole region is geared to the Middle East peace process commenced in Madrid. Instead of seeking to implement confidence-building measures such as the release of hundreds of innocent Lebanese civilians held at the notorious Al-Khiam Detention Centre in violation

of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the Israeli military continues its daily bombardments of Lebanon by land, sea or air, and incursions into Lebanon with additional armaments and artillery for the purpose of perpetuating the occupation.

The daily violence in southern Lebanon is the result of the continued Israeli occupation, which is the root of all problems between the two countries. As long as the occupation is allowed to continue, hostilities and bloodshed on Lebanese national soil will persist. Rather than succumb to the occupation of their land by force, the people of Lebanon, as sanctioned by the Charter of the United Nations, exercise their legal right of individual and collective resistance until Israel withdraws its forces from all Lebanese territory.

At the time of the last renewal of the UNIFIL mandate, the south came under heavy bombardment when scores of villages were levelled, thousands of homes destroyed, 150 civilians killed and 500,000 civilians forced to flee their homes. The Israeli Government called the invasion "Operation Accountability", the declared objective of which was the displacement of the civilian population and the flooding of Beirut with refugees. According to UNIFIL, the entire UNIFIL area of operation came under bombardment: immense damage was done to UNIFIL property and six UNIFIL soldiers sustained injuries. More recently, Israel's bombardment of UNIFIL positions led to the death of a Norwegian soldier and the wounding of several others, proving once again the aggressor's complete disregard for Lebanese sovereignty and the lives and mission of UNIFIL troops.

In spite of this, Lebanon remains wholly committed to the Middle East peace process and will continue in the bilateral negotiations in order to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East based on all relevant Security Council resolutions, and in particular resolution 425 (1978). Lebanon agreed to participate in the Madrid Conference and the subsequent rounds of negotiations in Washington on the basis of Security Council resolution 425 (1978). This was confirmed by the letter of assurances dated 18 October 1991 from the Government of the United States, as co-sponsor of the Conference, to the Government of Lebanon. It was Lebanon's clear understanding that the Middle East peace process would provide the framework in which Israel would implement Security Council resolution 425 (1978).

None the less, in view of the threat Israel's continued intransigence poses to this process, it remains incumbent upon the Security Council to demonstrate the inviolability of its resolutions. No Member State is above the law and the Council must take action to guarantee the prompt and long-overdue implementation of resolution 425 (1978) and the galvanization of its mechanism set out in resolution 426 (1978). This will enable the Lebanese Government to establish a bona fide peace by extending its authority over the entire south of the country up to its internationally recognized boundaries.

In this context, UNIFIL represents a valuable international commitment to the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty to the occupied south. Its much-needed support and humanitarian assistance perform a vital role in the daily life of the civilian population. However, this assistance cannot be a substitute for the fulfilment of UNIFIL's original mandate as stipulated in Security Council resolution 425 (1978), which is to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from

Lebanon and to assist the Government of Lebanon in re-establishing its legitimate and effective authority in the area, through its Army and internal security forces.

The Lebanese Government takes this opportunity to pay tribute to the UNIFIL command, troops and administrators and to the troop contributing countries for their efforts and sacrifices in serving the cause of peace. It expresses deep appreciation for the tireless endeavours of the Secretary-General and his assistants, which contribute to the valuable presence of UNIFIL in southern Lebanon.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Khalil MAKKAWI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/31
14 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication of 11 January 1994, which he has received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

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Annex

Letter dated 11 January 1994 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the Secretary-General

Please find attached the report of the twenty-second IAEA inspection in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). You may deem it appropriate to transmit the report to the members of the Security Council. I remain, of course, available with the Chief Inspectors, Messrs. Richard Hooper and Garry Dillon, for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Appendix

Report on the twenty-second IAEA on-site inspection in Iraq under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) 1-15 November 1993

SALIENT POINTS

- The twenty second IAEA inspection in Iraq was devoted to (i) the fall collection of surface water samples, (ii) further verification of the Iraqi January and August 1993 Annex 3 equipment declarations and equipment related information obtained outside Iraq, (iii) follow-up on information, particularly on the subject of centrifuge related technical advice that came from outside Iraq, provided during the 2-8 October 1993 high level talks in Baghdad, (iv) follow-up activities related to the nuclear material and (v) various monitoring activities. A total of 41 sites or establishments were visited in the course of this inspection.

- Part of the ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) effort in Iraq involves the periodic radiometric survey of the main water bodies in Iraq. This requires the collection of surface water, sediment and biota samples. Fifteen locations along the Tigris-Euphrates watersheds were sampled.

- Further progress was made during the course of the mission in clarifying, with the Iraqi side, the reporting requirements of Annex 3 of the IAEA's OMV plan and the reconciliation of Iraqi equipment declarations with information obtained outside of Iraq. Seventeen establishments were visited in connection with this work. A revised Annex 3 declaration that incorporated the identified improvements was handed over to the team at the conclusion of the mission.

- Two meetings were held with the Iraqi side on the subject of the technical advice they had obtained from sources outside Iraq that had aided their centrifuge development efforts. The details provided regarding the evolution of the Iraqi centrifuge programme, the areas where they experienced difficulties, their strategy for dealing with these

difficulties by seeking help from outside Iraq and, at the same time, taking advantage of additional information that was offered or otherwise obtained are credible. The very specific technical details provided regarding individual components of the Iraqi prototype magnetic centrifuges and the process through which they evolved are consistent with available information.

- Detailed microscopic examination, bulk density assessments and sampling for chemical analysis were performed on UO_2 contained in 201 drums declared by the Iraqi side to have come from Brazil. These results were, in turn, compared to UO_2 of Iraqi origin. This work together with a detailed review of literature describing Brazilian ore bodies and UO_2 production processes indicates that, pending results from the chemical analysis of samples, the material in question is not indigenous to Iraq (nor was it the result of an Iraqi UO_2 production process) and that the most likely source of the material is Brazil as declared. Further corroboration will be sought with the assistance of the Brazilian Government.

- Monitoring inspections were carried out at the eight so-called "core" sites of the former Iraqi nuclear programme. Existing building modifications, new construction and future plans for turning four of the sites (Tarmiya, Al Sharqat, Al Jezira and Al Furat) to other, non-nuclear applications were reviewed. A more detailed declaration relevant to Annex 2 of the IAEA's OMV plan was provided in the course of the mission.

- An action identified during a previous mission - the filling and sealing of the carbonate mine at Abu Skhair - was completed during IAEA-22. Overall, the inspection ran smoothly and the Iraqi side was helpful throughout.

INTRODUCTION

1. This report summarizes the results of the twenty-second mission carried out in Iraq by the IAEA under the United Nations Security Council resolution 687 (1991), with the assistance and co-operation of the Special Commission of the United Nations. The mission took place from 1 to 15 November and was headed by Mr. Richard Hooper of the IAEA for the period 1 to 7 November and Mr. Garry Dillon of the IAEA for the period 8 to 15 November. The complete team consisted of 17 inspectors (comprising 9 nationalities) and support staff. Several team members were not in Iraq for the entire inspection period depending on their availability and the work to be done.

2. The objectives of the mission were:

- the collection of surface water, sediment and biota samples at selected locations along the Tigris-Euphrates watersheds. This work is a continuing part of the monitoring effort in iraq;

- the further verification of the Iraqi Annex 3 equipment declarations of January and August 1993 and follow-up on equipment related information obtained outside Iraq;

- the follow-up on information, particularly on the subject of centrifuge related technical advice that came from outside Iraq, provided by the Iraqi side during the 2 - 8 October 1993 high level technical talks in Baghdad;

- the follow-up on questions regarding the nuclear material declared to have originated from Brazil and the nuclear material associated with the "30 July project";

- the conduct of monitoring inspections at sites previously visited.

3. Inspection activities were carried out at 41 sites or establishments. These are listed in Table 1.

ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE RADIOMETRIC HYDROLOGIC SURVEY

4. A baseline radiometric survey of the surface waters of Iraq was carried out during the fall of 1992. Water, sediment and biota samples were collected at 52 locations along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, their major tributaries and selected lake basins. The objectives of that survey were to provide added assurance that no undeclared nuclear activities (specifically undeclared reactor and/or reprocessing activities) existed in Iraq and to establish a baseline for a continuing sample collection effort under the OMV programme.

5. The IAEA's current monitoring programme for Iraq includes twice - a - year (spring and fall) radiometric surveys of surface waters. The first of these periodic sample collections was carried out during IAEA-19. The results obtained are consistent with the baseline. The second water sample collection for 1993 was conducted in the course of IAEA-22. A total of fifteen sites were sampled. The sample collection sites are given in Table 2 and indicated on the map labeled as Figure 1. Sample collection procedures were described in the IAEA-15 inspection report.

ACTIVITIES RELATED TO EQUIPMENT

6. During IAEA-22 the Iraqi side established a dual use equipment committee of Directors General from three state establishments to work with the inspection team to resolve (i) any remaining differences in the interpretation of Annex 3 reporting requirements and (ii) any differences between Iraqi declarations and procurement data obtained from outside Iraq. Overall this was a successful process:

Table 1

List of Sites/Establishments Inspected

1.	Tuwaitha, including locations B and C
2.	Al Nafad
3.	Al Shakyli storage
4.	Tarmiya
5.	Al Sharqat
6.	Al Jezira
7.	Al Qaim
8,	Al Furat
9.	Al Firnas (formerly Al Atheer)
10.	Rashdiya Design Centre
11.	Nassr State Establishment
12.	Al Nidda (formerly Al Rabiya)
13.	Badr State Establishment
14.	Um Al Maarick (formerly Auqba bin Nafi)
15.	Daura State Establishment for Heavy Engineering Equipment
16.	Al Amin
17.	Al Meelah
18.	Saddam State Establishment
19.	Al Radwan
20.	Al Amir
21.	Nahrawan
22.	Industrial Engine Factory*
23.	State Establishment for Electrical Industry*
24.	Al Kadesiya
25.	Center for Construction Research*
26.	Abu Skhair Carbonate Mine
27 - 41.	Fifteen sites (see table 2 and figure 1) where water, sediment and biota samples were taken

* visited for first time by IAEA.

- A common understanding of the Annex 3 reporting requirements evolved through a series of meetings with the Iraqi dual use equipment committee. Strong disagreement was expressed with respect to some reporting requirements, particularly for the coordinate measuring machines, but the revised Annex 3 declaration handed over at the end of the inspection contained the required items;

- The Iraqi side prepared a description of machine tools received from the Matrix Churchill company. The description, indicating machine type, utilization and current location (distributed across 18 establishments), is consistent with the Matrix Churchill shipping records. More that 85% of the machines have been seen by inspection teams. The remaining 15% are located and will be inspected during the next mission;

- There is generally good agreement between available manufacturer's shipping data and Iraqi equipment declarations. Several manufacturers have yet to respond to requests for information.

7. Equipment related inspections were carried out in seventeen establishments. Three of the sites, as indicated in Table 1, were visited for the first time by an IAEA inspection team. Several of the inspections were carried out without advance notice. Activities included the inspection of equipment identified in revised Iraqi declarations, the further evaluation of specific pieces of equipment vis a vis Annex 3 reporting requirements, and the monitoring of equipment utilization and seals check.

Table 2

Sample Collection Sites for the Fall 1993 Radiometric Survey of Iraq's Surface Waters

Name of the location	Region No.	Corresponding number on the map
Al Fathah	1	17
Tikrit	1	1c
Little Zab	2	2a
Al Mawsid	3	3
North of Kuwayr	3	3b
Saddam Dam	4	4a
Lake Habbaniyah	5	5b
North Baghdad	6	6a
Nahr al Uzaym	7	7a
Hit	8	47
Diyala River	9	9a
South of Sarabadi	10	10b
Shatt al Zharref	10	10c
Al Kufah	10	10h
Third River	10	10i



Figure 1

Sample collection sites for the Fall 1993 Radiometric Survey of Iraq's Surface Waters

ACTIVITIES RELATED TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL

8. The IAEA-18 inspection report contains a detailed description of verification results that called into question the origin(s) of 20.6 tonnes of natural uranium in the form of UO_2 declared by the Iraqi side to have come from Brazil and the declared source(s) of material processed in the "30 July Project" carried out in the building 73 complex at Tuwaitha.

9. A detailed microscopic examination, bulk density assessments and sampling for chemical analysis were performed on UO_2 contained in 201 drums declared by the Iraqi side to have come from Brazil. These results were, in turn, compared to UO_2 of Iraqi origin. This work together with a detailed review of literature describing Brazilian ore bodies and UO_2 production processes (both chemical and mechanical aspects) indicates that, pending results from the chemical analysis of samples, the material in question is not indigenous to Iraq (nor was it the result of an Iraqi UO_2 production process) and that the most likely source of the material is Brazil as declared.

10. The Iraqi side provided a list of analytical values for part of the material. They also indicated that the original order was for 100 tonnes of UO_2 to be delivered in five shipments but that the arrangement was informal with no contract or other formal documentation. They further describe that after receiving two shipments (27 tonnes) without any certification regarding the contents they became unhappy with the quality of the material and terminated the arrangement. Further corroboration will be sought with the assistance of the Brazilian Government.

    The UO_2 contained in the 201 drums is a mixture of coarse powder, fine powder, compacted powder and small spheres. Given that levels of impurities are within acceptable limits, requirements for physical qualities depend upon the end use. The end use intended by the Iraqi side was conversion to UCl_4 or UF_4.

The material declared to have come from Brazil is of poor quality for this use because of its extremely low reactive surface. Iraqi chemists indicate that the portion of the material that was used to produce UCl_4 in building 85 at Tuwaitha was subjected to successive siftings before it was introduced to the production process.

11. No progress was made in resolving the contradiction between the source(s) of material contained in filters declared to have been removed from building 73a and the source(s) of material that Iraq has declared was utilized in the "30 July Project" (see inspection report for IAEA-18). At the first high level talks in New York (31 August - 9 September 1993) the Iraqi side reported that they had interviewed a number of former IAEC employees who had worked in the relevant areas in Tuwaitha. The results of these interviews had indicated that filters from several Tuwaitha facilities (including those from the UCl_4 production area in building 85, where both Brazilian and Al Jezira (Al Qaim) material was used, had been collected together and sent to building 73a for recovery and disposal. This explanation was repeated to the IAEA-22 inspection team and the Iraqi side stated that they had nothing further to add. There is, of course, no way to verify where individual filters had been installed.

12. However, regardless of where the filters were installed, samples from waste solutions declared to have derived from operations carried out in buildings 73a and 73b and samples from a kiln declared to have been installed in building 73a contain uranium consistent with Al Qaim material (i.e., the same material as found in the filters). The obvious explanation consistent with the sample data and inspector observations is that all of the activities declared to have been carried out in the building 73 complex, i.e.,

- the "30 July Project" fuel fabrication experiments utilizing mostly safeguarded material (of Italian origin) in a safeguarded facility (buildings 73a and 73b)

and

- the uranium metal production work utilizing unsafeguarded material (primarily of Al Qaim origin) in an unsafeguarded facility (building 73c)

were, in fact, carried out in buildings 73a and 73b only.

ACTIVITIES RELATED TO URANIUM ENRICHMENT

13. Prior to the recent round of high level technical talks that began in late August the most important open questions regarding the Iraqi uranium enrichment efforts concerned the sources of the maraging steel and outside technical advice for their centrifuge programme. Both of these questions were highlighted in the report from the 31 August - 8 September 1993 meetings in New York (see UN document S/26451 dated 16 September 1993). During the second series of high level technical talks held in Baghdad (2-8 October 1993) the Iraqi side provided credible information on both issues.

14. The Iraqi side identified an individual as their agent for the procurement of the maraging steel. They indicated that they received the 100 tonnes of steel in two consignments. They described the physical configuration of the material and the transportation route from a northern European port to Iraq. The Iraqi side reiterated that they did not know who manufactured the steel but offered some speculation regarding the nationality of the manufacturer based on circumstantial evidence. Follow-up action has been requested of the appropriate Member State Governments.

15. The information provided by the Iraqi side, during the Baghdad high level technical meetings (2 - 8 October 1993), regarding the sources and circumstances through which they obtained technical advice from outside Iraq that aided their centrifuge development work was credible but lacked detail. The necessary details to complete the picture were provided to the twenty-second inspection team. The names of the individuals, the circumstances under which they got involved and the details of the technical help they, wittingly or unwittingly, provided are not being disclosed pending decisions by Member State Governments regarding past or current legal actions. However, in general terms, technical help was provided in the following areas:

- vacuum and clean room technologies, heat treatment of maraging steel and advice regarding machine tools;

- simulation software for design and evaluation applications;

- advice regarding the procurement of specific components and equipment;

- two general assembly drawings and 10-12 drawings of specific components;

- technical specifications for some specific components.

The Iraqi side reviewed their work on the Beams type oil centrifuge and emphasized the importance of this experience in targeting the technical areas where they had difficulties when they moved on to the Zippe type magnetic centrifuge. This allowed them to focus and carefully manage their search for help outside Iraq. The acquisition of the general assembly and component drawings was fortuitous and served to greatly accelerate their programme. Iraq's centrifuge development at the time of the Gulf War involved two basic designs (maraging steel and carbon

fiber rotor) and a number of variation in the detailed design of components that evolved directly from the general assembly and component drawings obtained outside Iraq. The Iraqi plan, which was well on its way, was to procure the components necessary for about 50 prototype machines from outside Iraq while they were developing their own manufacturing capability. Some components were procured directly and others were being obtained indirectly under the cover of demonstration tests as they negotiated for the purchase of machine tools.

MONITORING ACTIVITIES AT CORE SITES

16. Inspections to monitor activities at the Al Sharqat, Tarmiya, Rashdiya, Tuwaitha, Al Furat, Al Firnas [Al Atheer], Al Jezira and Al Qaim sites were carried out during the twenty-second mission. Iraqi activities to convert four of these sites (Al Sharqat, Tarmiya, Al Furat and Al Jezira) to non-nuclear use are proceeding and the status of the development at the sites was evaluated and compared against the respective declarations made in accordance with Annex 2 of the OMV, where these were available. Nothing was observed that was indicative of prohibited activities.

Al Sharqat The entire site was inspected. The construction of the nitric/sulfuric acid production plants east of the EMIS chemical recovery area was progressing quickly with the shells of several buildings more than 50% complete. None of the buildings are ready for internal finishing and no plant components are installed, or in evidence on the site. The building descriptions given appeared to be in agreement with the "declaration" received in accordance with Annex 2 of the OMV. The current labor force was stated to be about 40 Al Qa Qaa personnel and about 300 construction workers. The facility will eventually be the principal supplier of nitric and sulfuric acid to the Iraqi industry.

The former EMIS site at Al Sharqat was inspected. The site remains unchanged from previous inspections. There was no indications that any attempts were being made to convert the buildings to other

FIGURE 2



(non-nuclear) usage and it was stated that the badly damaged buildings would simply be abandoned.

Tarmiya The Tarmiya site (fig. 2) is being adapted to the requirements of the Research Centre for Industrial Chemistry which was established in March 1992. Visits were made to the facilities which had been converted to commercial non-nuclear applications and to those facilities which had been of significance in the former EMIS programme. The activities planned or in progress in the converted facilities were generally consistent with the declaration previously provided. Of note was the usage of mixer-settlers. In building 45/46 there were twin banks of 16 small (≈300 ml) units, which had been brought from Tuwaitha and were being used for the separation of lanthanides. A set of 32 larger (≈1litre) units were being used on a project concerned with vanadium extraction and 15 mixer-settlers units of 5 litre capacity were being used for the purification of phosphoric acid.

In addition to the facilities previously declared, the team was advised that building 64 was now allocated to "Medical and Safety", building 291 to "Administration" and building 271 to "Engineering Services". With the exception of buildings 107 & 109 (Engineering Services), all the buildings declared to have been converted to commercial, non-nuclear usage were visited and their utilization was checked to be consistent with the declaration.

Buildings 249/251 (stores 1,2 & 3) appeared to be unremarkable [although a co-located chemical store contained ≈30 large, greater than 5 litre ingots of metallic antimony.].

The buildings on the site remain unchanged from previous inspections. Two halls of building 230 are being used for the storage of spent catalyst from Al Qaim, awaiting recovery of molybdenum and a stock of flue slag from oil burning power stations from which it is intended to recover vanadium.

Rashdiya A short notice inspection of the Engineering Design Centre at Rashdiya was carried out. The main functions of the Institute were described to be:

- Production of carbon black for the paint and rubber industry
- Design work e.g., for steel plate rolling mills for Nassr
- Lab scale production of copper benzoate
- Coating and plating
- Analytical chemistry
- Mechanical/physical properties testing

It was stated that the staff of Rashdiya numbered just less than 300 of which approximately 100 were on-site at the Beji site operating a carbon black pilot plant and 65 were working at Al Nahrawan. The facility itself was unremarkable except for the characteristic lack of activity.

The security fence between the west and east sections of the site had been enlarged by the addition of four rows of concrete blocks and two strands of barbed wire. As planned, a request was made to visit the east building which resulted in some confusion on the Iraqi side regarding the IAEA's rights of access vis a vis the original designation. The east building has now been separated from the Rashdiya Institute and is currently identified as a factory for the production of agricultural machinery. This particular building has been repeatedly inspected by the IAEA. The situation was clarified with the senior Iraqi counterpart and after only a minor delay access was granted.

The building was subjected to a detailed re-examination and sketches and photographic records were made. There were no indications of activity or preparation for usage of the building.

Tuwaitha All of the principal facilities at the Tuwaitha site were inspected including Location C, Al Nafad and the spent fuel storage site (Location B). Seals were checked and some replaced on a random basis at all relevant locations. Additional tree samples were taken for tritium analysis.

Al Furat Civil engineering work is about 70% complete with internal finishing in progress in a number of the new buildings. The intended use of each building was described to the team and recorded on the site layout plan which was provided by the Iraqi counterparts. It was stated that MIC intends to use the site for general mechanical and chemical engineering R&D activities needed to support the armed forces. All of the original buildings of the site are being refurbished. For example, B00 is being converted to offices and mechanical engineering workshops, B03 is to be an incoming materials store and B04 is to be a computer building having an IBM and Vax machine supported by HP personal computers. Buildings B01 and B02 remain untouched.

It was explained that about 500 people would be employed at the site once it is complete. The scientific and engineering staff would be transferred from other facilities.

Al Firnas (Al Atheer) Inspection of the facilities indicated that the Annex 2 declaration of the purpose of the 're-dedicated' site seemed to be somewhat overstated and there was some difficulty in correlating the declared activities with the range of practical work that was actually in progress. For example, the so-called pilot plant for tungsten carbide recovery was small scale, very basic and directed toward the pulverization and acid cleaning (cobalt removal) of old cutting tool bits. The pilot plant for the production of aircraft components (heat sinks) was found to be no more than a small disk-brake refurbishment workshop. The Iraqi counterparts were helpful,

if not fully acquainted with the scope of the declaration, and facilitated visits to all locations requested.

Al Qaim Most of the principal buildings on the site were visited, in particular, the former uranium purification plant. From an operational point this plant is utterly destroyed and the Iraqi side wants to salvage equipment from this plant to be utilized in other plants on the Al Qaim site. It was also stated that the Iraqi side intends to carry out a comprehensive clean-up of the plant to minimize environmental contamination, in particular leaching to ground-water. The principal plant items targeted for salvage are high quality stainless steel tanks, pipes and flanges. Some control equipment is also planned to be recovered. The Iraqi side was advised that they would receive a written response to their request asking for an inventory of plant items that are proposed to be salvaged. Samples were taken of the dilute phosphoric acid and the ammonium nitrate raw product.

Al Jezira The former nuclear related facilities and the new pilot plant for the Fe_2O_3 project were inspected. The Fe_2O_3 plant was found to be essentially as described in the Annex 2 declaration. The process building was still a skeleton structure but the buildings housing ancillaries services were well advanced. In connection with the low concentration uranium bearing wastes remaining in two of the three large settling tanks it was observed that the contents of the second settling tank had evaporated to dryness and the sludge recovered. The resulting 59 drums (200 l) of material will be transferred to Location C before the next inspection. Drums of solid low-level waste had been removed from the store adjacent to the tanks and have been stored in tank 1. A token amount of concrete has been poured on top of these drums but not enough to serve any meaningful protection against corrosion or dusting. It was agreed that after the next consignment of drums has been transferred to tank 1 a more substantial amount of concrete will be poured.

The rubble from the north end of the UCl_4 plant has been removed to the UO_2 production plant compound. Some remaining sections of the UCl_4 process building are being refurbished. The UO_2 feed hall has now been isolated and converted into a store (as yet unused) and the office area at the other end of the plant is being totally refurbished and up-dated. The main process hall is "untouched" and the Iraqi side stated that there are no plans to utilize this part of the building. Refurbishment of the services building next to the UCl_4 plant is under consideration. It is still planned to close off the UO_2 plant compound and use it for active waste storage although no action has yet been taken to fence off and gate the access point. These actions to recover and utilize moderately damaged portions of the UCl_4 production buildings are contrary to an agreement with the Iraqi side made and documented during the fifteenth mission. Clarification will be sought during the next inspection. Some 30-40 used filter packs, stored near the entrance to the main UCl_4 process hall are to be transferred to Tuwaitha along with the drums of sludge from tank 2.

The IAEA seals on all four tagged equipment items were checked and one seal was changed.

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LETTER DATED 13 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you a text of the communiqué on the second round of negotiations concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia, held at Geneva from 11 to 13 January 1994.

I also request that you convene a meeting of the Security Council in order to discuss the question of dispatching United Nations peace-keeping forces to the region and other provisions mentioned in the document.

I would be grateful if this letter and its enclosure were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Peter CHKHEIDZE
Permanent Representative
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary

Annex

Communiqué on the second round of negotiations between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides in Geneva

The second round of negotiations on a comprehensive settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict took place from 11 to 13 January 1994 in Geneva under the aegis of the United Nations with the facilitation of the Russian Federation and with the participation of a representative of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and a representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The negotiations were held in accordance with Security Council resolutions 849 (1993) of 9 July 1993, 854 (1993) of 6 August 1993, 858 (1993) of 24 August 1993, 876 (1993) of 19 October 1993, 881 (1993) of 4 November 1993 and 892 (1993) of 22 December 1993.

It was noted that the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding of 1 December 1993 are, for the most part, being implemented.

An exchange of prisoners has taken place on the principle of "all for all".

Representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees have undertaken a first preparatory visit with a view to examining the feasibility of the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their places of permanent residence.

There has been an increase in the number of international observers in the conflict zone.

On 15 and 16 December 1993 in Moscow a meeting took place of the group of experts consisting of representatives of the parties to the conflict, the United Nations, the Russian Federation and an observer of the CSCE to prepare recommendations on the political status of Abkhazia.

At the same time it was noted that hostilities took place in individual areas of the zone of conflict carried out by uncontrolled armed groups, as a result of which part of the population experienced new privations.

Work to find the missing and the dead has not yet begun.

During the course of the second round of negotiations in Geneva the parties emphasized the need to continue efforts for the early achievement of a comprehensive settlement of the conflict.

1. The parties reaffirmed their commitment not to use force or the threat of force against each other.

2. The parties agreed that the establishment of favourable conditions for further progress towards a political settlement and the practical implementation of agreements will be promoted by the deployment of a full-scale peace-keeping

operation in Abkhazia. They have appealed to the Security Council at its forthcoming consideration of the activities of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) for an appropriate expansion of its mandate, inter alia, to entrust it with control of the non-resumption of hostilities in the zone of conflict. The parties continued to favour the deployment in the conflict zone of United Nations peace-keeping forces or other forces authorized by the United Nations. They expressed their mutual consent to the use of a Russian military contingent as part of such forces.

Within five days after deployment in the zone of conflict, in accordance with a decision of the Security Council, of an additional number of international observers and following the arrival of peace-keeping forces, the parties shall carry out the withdrawal of all armed units, with their weapons and military equipment, from the Inguri river and other possible lines of active confrontation in the conflict zone to a distance to be determined by the officers commanding the peace-keeping forces and UNOMIG, with the agreement of the parties. Simultaneously, international observers and peace-keeping forces will enter the areas thus formed.

There shall be complete disarmament and withdrawal of all kinds of volunteer units and individuals participating in the conflict. Inspections by international observers are permitted at crossing points on the Psou river.

The parties appeal to the Security Council for an intensification of the international civilian presence in the conflict zone, and for this purpose it would be necessary to deploy appropriate civilian experts who will assist in resolving the problems of refugees and other humanitarian issues.

3. In the view of the parties a resolution of the problems of a settlement would be promoted by the establishment of a special voluntary fund under the aegis of the United Nations.

4. The parties will continue to work out a quadripartite agreement on the voluntary return and repatriation to Abkhazia of refugees and displaced persons.

The parties have agreed to establish a special commission on refugees consisting of the parties, the United Nations and the Russian Federation which will begin work on 25 January 1994.

The parties agreed to begin on 10 February 1994 the implementation of the phased process of the return of refugees and displaced persons to Abkhazia, and as a first step to the Gali region. The parties will take necessary measures to ensure the safety of refugees, displaced persons and personnel involved in this operation. The Abkhaz side has the primary responsibility for the reception and security of the refugees and also of the above-mentioned personnel. Moreover, the parties are requesting the United Nations and the Russian Federation to render them assistance in creating a safe environment conducive to the return of refugees and displaced persons.

The parties are counting on effective assistance from UNHCR and, inter alia, on the commencement as soon as possible of operations in the zone of conflict by an interim division of UNHCR.

5. The parties recognize that the primary objective is a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict and that all efforts are contributions to its achievement. They agreed to continue discussion of the problem of the political status of Abkhazia taking into account mutual interests. The next meeting of experts on this issue will take place in Moscow beginning on 8 February 1994. Their report will be considered at the next meeting of the parties and will be sent to the United Nations and the CSCE.

The United Nations, the CSCE and the Russian Federation call upon the parties to proceed from the need to observe the territorial integrity of Georgia and fully to ensure the interests of the entire multinational population of Abkhazia, these being the fundamental principles of a comprehensive settlement.

6. The parties expressed their interest in the establishment no later than 15 February of an international commission to assist in economic recovery in Abkhazia with the participation of international and national organizations. Among its highest priorities must be the restoration of vital facilities, transport, communications, airports, bridges and tunnels.

7. The parties to the negotiations agreed to hold their next meeting on 22 February 1994 in Moscow or Geneva.

For the Georgian side:	For the Abkhaz side:
(Signed)	(Signed)
J. IOSELIANI	S. JINJOLIA

In the presence of:

From the United Nations:	From the Russian Federation:	From the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe:
(Signed)	(Signed)	(Signed)
E. BRUNNER	B. PASTUKHOV	V. MANNO

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF DJIBOUTI, NIGERIA AND RWANDA ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We, the undersigned members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that the Security Council invite Mr. Kingsley Makhubela, Acting Chief Representative of the African National Congress (ANC), to address it during the course of its consideration of the item "The question of South Africa" in accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

(Signed) Roble OLHAYE
Representative of Djibouti

(Signed) Ibrahim A. GAMBARI
Representative of Nigeria

(Signed) Jean Damascene BIZIMANA
Representative of Rwanda

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15 January 1994

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LETTER DATED 14 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ERITREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have been instructed by my Government to transmit the attached letter dated 3 January 1994 from H.E. Mr. Isaias Afwerki, President of the State of Eritrea, addressed to Your Excellency, which I received today.

I should be grateful if you would have the enclosed letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ghirmai GHEBREMARIAM
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Letter dated 3 January 1994 from the President of Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council

I wish to bring Your Excellency's attention a grave incident that occurred along our borders with the Sudan and that may, if left unchecked, plunge the region into another bout of war and conflict. This is not, it must be noted, an isolated incident. Rather, it marks an escalation in the spiral of wilful acts of subversion and provocation that the Sudanese National Islamic Front and its Government have been perpetrating in the past. Allow me to describe briefly the circumstances surrounding the recent dangerous development.

On 16 December 1993, a group of 20 armed "jihad" agents crossed the border from the Sudan, entered our territory illegally and clashed with our border patrol units at Ad Hako, about 20 kilometres inside the country. In the skirmishes that followed, all the "jihad" infiltrators were killed. The Eritrean Armed Forces lost a platoon commander with the rank of lieutenant.

Subsequently, it was established that there were two North Africans among the killed "jihad" groups.

While such irresponsible acts of sabotage across our frontiers with the Sudan are not new, the presence of non-Eritreans on a subversive mission is a new development. In a sense, this is not surprising since the so-called jihad movement is the creation of the Sudanese National Islamic Front; a fact that is not denied by the National Islamic Front itself.

The Government of Eritrea has been fully aware of these facts. But, in spite of the provocative acts of border incursions and subversion in the past several years, it chose to mitigate and resolve the crisis through patience and by fostering a constructive dialogue with the National Islamic Front and its Government. The Government of Eritrea opted for this path because it believes that the bonds of mutual interest and respect that link both peoples together are profound and transcend these temporary problems.

But, the National Islamic Front and its Government have persisted in their deceitful game of mixed signals and false promises. They have refused to heed our calls for reason. In the meantime, they have been working frantically to weaken and overthrow the Government of Eritrea as well as to expand their influence in the Horn and destabilize the whole region.

One of the weak points that the National Islamic Front is exploiting to promote its objectives is the Eritrean refugee community in the Sudan. These refugees, who have been dislocated from their homeland in the course of the past three decades of war, generally live in abysmal poverty. They are further enduring moral and psychological stress as third-class citizens. The National Islamic Front is viciously exploiting their desperate status, literally using them as hostages, and forcibly conscripting them into its "people's militias" to serve its strategy.

Partial responsibility for this deplorable state of affairs must surely rest on the international community. Indeed, the failure of the international community to defend their rights, the lack of tangible response to the repeated appeals that the Government has made on their behalf as well as its incapacity to make progress on the bilateral arrangements that it sought to forge with Khartoum have all combined to aggravate their vulnerability to and victimization by National Islamic Front strategy.

The National Islamic Front has otherwise blindly set out on a perilous road of regional expansion and destabilization using religion as a convenient tool. It has already devised extensive programmes to advance this dream.

The Eritrean people have paid more than their share of precious sacrifices in the imposed war that raged for three decades. To exact further sacrifices from them at this juncture cannot be defensible by any standards; nor can they endure such a burden. The curtailment of acts of subversion that are aimed at disturbing the peace that they have won at so much cost must surely be a responsibility that the international community shares jointly with them. In this spirit, the Government of Eritrea appeals to Your Excellency to denounce and take appropriate measures against the National Islamic Front for its acts of subversion and interference in the affairs of a sovereign State in contravention of accepted norms of international behaviour. We also appeal to Your Excellency's Government to take necessary measures to defend the rights of the refugees in the country of exile and assist them in their quest to return to their homeland. Needless to say, the Government of Eritrea will not bear any consequences that may result from the illegal and unconstructive policy that the National Islamic Front has set in motion.

(Signed) Isaias AFWERKI
President

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S/1994/35
17 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 22 DECEMBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF NORWAY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and with reference to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 883 (1993) concerning the embargo against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Norwegian national regulations* relating to the implementation of Security Council resolution 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992 with amendments of 1 December 1993 relating to the implementation of Security Council resolution 883 (1993) of 11 November 1993.

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* The text of the regulations may be consulted in Room S-3545.

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NOTE VERBALE DATED 3 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF FINLAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to inform him of the measures Finland has taken to implement Security Council resolution 883 (1993).

As regards the relevant paragraphs of Security Council resolution 883 (1993), Finland has issued a decree amending the previous decree of 16 April 1992 (336/92) on the enforcement of obligations arising from Security Council resolution 748 (1992) to the effect that the additional measures prescribed by the Security Council in resolution 883 (1993) have been implemented. The decree was issued on 26 November 1993 and entered into force on 1 December 1993, in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 883 (1993). The contents of the decree have been notified to the relevant national authorities and administrative instructions to the pertinent officials have been issued.

The text of the decree is annexed to the present note.*

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* The text of the decree may be consulted in room S-3545.

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NOTE VERBALE DATED 6 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF CUBA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of Cuba to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and has the honour to inform him, in accordance with paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 883 (1993) and on instructions from the pertinent Cuban authorities, that the Government of Cuba has taken due note of the obligations set out in paragraphs 3 to 7 of that resolution. The contents of the resolution have been circulated to all the national bodies concerned, despite the fact that, in Cuba, there are no funds of Libyan undertakings or institutions, no commercial transactions are carried out with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in connection with the supply of equipment and technology for the petroleum industry, nor is any type of relation maintained with Libyan Arab Airlines.

It also informs the Secretary-General that the level of the Libyan diplomatic staff at Havana is the same as that prevailing when the Security Council adopted resolution 748 (1992).

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S/1994/38
17 January 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 12 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF MADAGASCAR TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 883 (1993) of 11 November 1993, I have the honour, on instructions from my Government, to inform you that Madagascar does not have extensive relations of cooperation with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the areas cited in paragraph 3 of the aforementioned resolution. Nevertheless, instructions have been given to the Government departments concerned to ensure that the resolution is rigorously applied.

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S/1994/39
17 January 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 12 JANUARY 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CYPRUS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to Security Council resolution 883 (1993) adopted on 11 November 1993, has the honour to report on the following measures instituted by Cyprus for meeting the obligations set out in paragraphs 3 to 7 of the said resolution:

(a) The Council of Ministers, on 22 December 1993, with resolution No. 40.350, decided on immediate action by all competent authorities on all of the necessary measures for full compliance with the provisions of resolution 883 (1993);

(b) Subsequently, the Central Bank of Cyprus issued a circular-letter, by which it calls upon all domestic and offshore banks that conduct business in Cyprus to comply fully with the stipulations of the new resolution;

(c) The Minister of Trade and Industry will issue an order in which the export, re-export and transit of goods to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya as mentioned in the annex and in paragraph 5 of the resolution will be forbidden;

(d) In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6, the Libyan side was called upon to shut down the offices of Libyan Airlines in Cyprus. The Libyan side complied with the directions, shut down the offices in Nicosia and is now repatriating the two employees to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

The Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations would like to underline the determination of the Government of Cyprus to comply fully with all the provisions of the said resolution.

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